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3． 与纯 A 股上市公司相比，跨市场上市公司更倾向于聘请“四大”为其
境内 A 股报表提供审计。 
4． 与单一市场上市公司相比，跨市场上市公司在境内更有可能选择拥有协
同审计能力或者跨市场审计能力的会计师事务所，并且跨香港市场上市的公司将
比跨 B 股市场上市的公司表现出更强的倾向性。 
5． 如果境内事务所具有协同审计能力或者跨市场审计能力，那么它将能够






















































Auditor selection has been a key issue for accounting academics, practitioners, 
and regulators. But till now, it is still a confusing question why Chinese A-share listed 
companies select Big 4 to audit their A-share financial statements. Many researchers 
concluded that there are no market demands for high quality audits, so western 
classical auditor selection theories can’t explain Chinese phenomena sufficiently.  
My dissertation begins with the question why Chinese listed firms select Big 4 to 
audit their A-share financial statements. After analyzing characters of A-share listed 
firms who select Big 4 as their auditors of A-share financial statements, we find that 
more than half of them are cross-listed firms. Then our question turns into why 
cross-listed firms are much more inclined to select Big 4 to audit their A-share 
financial statements than purely domestic-listed firms. Combined with the special 
market environments and duplicate audit arrangements faced by cross-listed firms, we 
raise the synergic effect and scope economy hypothesis.  
In our research, we also find that in addition to the influence on the auditor 
selection to Big 4, the synergic effect and scope economy also has an effect on the 
auditor selection to non-Big 4. So we extend our research into the discussion of 
influence of the synergic audit ability and cross market audit ability on the auditor 
selection and the market share of CPAs. In the end of this dissertation, we also 
investigate the effect of the model of the auditor selection of cross-listed firms on the 
audit pricing. 
From the dissertation, we are able to draw some conclusions： 
1. In comparison to the A-share market, the cross-listed firms are more inclined 
to select Big 4 in overseas market, and relative to B-share market, the cross-listed 
firms prefer selecting Big 4 in H-share market. 
2. For the reason of synergic effect and scope economy, if a cross-listed firm 
select Big 4 as its overseas auditor, it will be inclined to select Big 4 to audit its 
A-share financial statements. 
3. Relative to purely domestic-listed firms, cross-listed firms are more inclined to 
select Big 4 to audit its A-share financial statements. 
4. In comparison to firms only listing in A-share market, cross-listed firms are 
more inclined to select auditors which have the synergic audit ability or cross market 













cross-listing into Hong Kong market will more likely to do so. 
5. If domestic auditors have the synergic audit ability or cross market audit 
ability, they can occupy more shares in the cross-listed firms audit market, and the 
more early the domestic auditors get the ability, the more cross-listed firms audit 
market share they can occupy. 
6. When the auditors audit the financial statements for overseas markets, the 
audit fees charged by Big 4 is significantly higher than that charged by non-Big 4. 
Otherwise, if the auditors audit the A-share financial statements, the fees charged by 
Big 4 is not significantly different from that charged by other auditors. 
7. The synergic effect and scope economy also have influence on the audit fees. 
If auditors can realize the synergic effect or scope economy in duplicate audits, which 
can save the time and energy of the management, cross-listed firms will pay more 
audit fees. 
The contributions of the dissertation include: 
1. In order to explain the auditor selection in China where the demand for high 
quality audit is not given, we raise the synergic effect and scope economy hypothesis. 
This hypothesis enriches the theoretical framework for auditor selection. Combined 
with other researchers’ conclusions, we believe, the synergic effect and scope 
economy hypothesis explains why Chinese listed firms actively choose Big 4 to audit 
their A-share financial statements. 
2. The dissertation provides a more detailed explanation of the motivation why 
Chinese firms choose Big 4 from the perspective of market segment, and it also 
provides the evidence that there is still no demand for high quality audit in China 
stock market. So till now, we can’t directly take the selection to Big 4 as the symbol 
of good corporate governance. 
3. The dissertation first systematically studies the auditor selection behavior of 
cross-listed firms in duplicate audit arrangements. Our conclusions show that listed 
firms will adjust their behavior according to the change of environments. It is 
consistent with enterprise evolutionism and economic Darwinism. 
4. The dissertation shows that cross-listed firms are a special group, whose 
corporate governance and behavior are always different from those of purely 














5. Till now, some researchers have found that audit fee charged by the auditors 
which come from the same group are higher than that charged by the auditors coming 
from the different groups, but they failed to provide a explanation. The dissertation 
first explains this phenomenon with the theory of synergic effect and scope economy.  
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